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Abstract. In this position paper we discuss the importance of giving a
proper account of unknowability in argument-based reasoning, suggest
that existing formal tools are not fully adequate in this respect and lay
down the basics of a research program in this direction.
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1 Introduction
Human knowledge is obviously limited and anyone has to admit that there are
things whose knowledge is beyond the present and possibly also future capabil-
ities of any human being, due to various kinds of limitations. For instance, the
fact that a new drug is effective for a given disease cannot be known in absence
of an adequate testing. While such a limitation appears to be temporary and
can be overcome with adequate actions and resources, other can be more radical.
For instance, the answer to some computational problems in the worst case may
require an amount of resources which overcomes Bremermann’s limit[4], namely
the maximum computational speed of a self-contained system in the material
universe. Even more, some things are formally known to be unknowable based
on undecidability proofs, like the famous Gödel theorems.
Theoretical limitations apart, unknowability plays a significant role in many
practical debates about important questions.
Consider discussions about very complex global issues like climate change or
world-level economic policies. Questions like “Are the causes of global warming
natural or human related?” or “Are free trade policies good or bad for develop-
ing countries?” may receive both quite bold answers on either side, but one can
also put forward the standpoint that any definite position on such issues is unac-
ceptable, since it is actually impossible to provide well-founded answers to such
questions. This standpoint, while possibly unsatisfactory from a psychological
point of view, might turn out to be the most reasonable one, in the light of the
currently available knowledge and evidences, and of the fact that such problems
are “untamable” due to their intrinsic huge complexity.
In this paper, expanding a preliminary discussion in [2], we argue that un-
knowability gives rise to a special kind of undecidedness, called epistemological
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undecidedness, and that it requires a proper formal treatment, which calls for
a non-standard use and revision of existing argumentation formalisms. Then,
we discuss the main ideas of a preliminary proposal aimed at overcoming these
limitations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of un-
knowability and provides some motivation for dealing with it in argumentation,
and Section 3 sketches a solution by adapting the well-known ASPIC+formalism.
The solution is briefly illustrated by means of an example in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 draws some conclusions focusing on future work.
2 Unknowability and Epistemological Undecidedness
In most argumentation systems the language adopted to construct arguments
allows one to assert two truth-values for each proposition, i.e. a proposition can
either be (asserted as) true or (asserted as) false. Usually this is obtained by
equipping the language with classical negation, so that asserting that p is false
can be expressed as the assertion that ¬p is true. Accordingly, each argument
takes a definite position on its conclusion, supporting the acceptance of a propo-
sition p or the acceptance of its negation ¬p.
As a consequence, undecidedness on propositions is a derived concept which
arises from the evaluation of relevant arguments. For the sake of explanation, let
is consider a Dung’s style evaluation of arguments by means of a unique-status
semantics [5], like grounded semantics, where arguments can be evaluated as
undefeated, i.e. justified, defeated, i.e. attacked by an undefeated argument, or
provisionally defeated, corresponding to an intermediate status which is assigned
e.g. to arguments that are counter-attacked by equally preferred arguments.
Considering a particular proposition p, we can then distinguish four possible
justification states for p, the last two ones corresponding to (different kinds of)
indecision:
– p is accepted, in case there is an argument for p which is undefeated
– p is rejected, in case there is an argument for ¬p which is undefeated
– p is unknown, in case there are no arguments for p and ¬p, or the only
arguments for p and ¬p are defeated
– p is contradictory, in case there is an argument for p which is provisionally
defeated.
As mentioned in Section 1, a different kind of undecidedness, called epistemo-
logical undecidedness, relies on an explicit reason supporting the standpoint that
any definite answer on a proposition p is unacceptable, i.e. that p is unknowable.
Examples of reasons why a proposition p is unknowable include:
– Universal principles (like Heisenberg’s) saying that you cannot know every-
thing at the same time. For instance, if you know the speed of a particle
with a given precision then its momentum is unknowable with “the same”
precision.
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– Evidence from common knowledge: if there is a question which is known to
be very debated with many disagreements about it, or a question that is
still unsolved despite many attempts, one can infer that it is unknowable to
everybody (e.g. the Millennium Prize Problems).
– Something which is not unknowable in principle but it is impossible to verify
in any reasonable time horizon, e.g. whether there is life on a potentially
habitable planet outside the Solar System.
It is important to point out the difference between epistemological undecided-
ness and the undecided justification states introduced above. The main difference
is that epistemological undecidedness is not the result of argument evaluation,
but originates from single arguments that can independently support the con-
clusion that a proposition p is unknowable. Thus, it clearly differs both from
the status of “contradictory” and from that of “unknown”. More specifically,
differently from the case where p is contradictory, it does not arise from contra-
dictory information: a single argument may support unknowability for a specific
non contradictory reason, and in case this argument has no counterarguments
then unknowability of p is accepted. Moreover, differently from the case where p
is unknown, there is an explicit valid argument supporting unknowability, which
is able to attack all those arguments that say that p is true or p is false.
In a nutshell, epistemological undecidedness and derived undecidedness are
orthogonal concepts: whereas epistemological undecidedness concerns the level
of assertions (language level), the justification states mentioned above concern
the evaluation of arguments and their conclusions. Thus, it may well be possible
that e.g. unknowability of p is contradictory since an argument supporting that p
is unknowable is counterattacked by an equally preferable argument supporting
that p is true.
As a final comment, it is worth noting that epistemological undecidedness
cannot be encompassed by Pollock’s undercutting attack [9]. The latter amounts
to infer that a specific defeasible rule is not applicable because a particular ex-
ceptional condition holds. For instance, the fact that an object looks red is a
defeasible reason for believing that the object is red, however this derivation is
undercut in the specific circumstance that the object is illuminated by a red
light. Similarly to the case where an argument supports unknowability, under-
cutting attack does not support a definite truth value (in the example above,
the possibility that the object is red for other reasons remains open). However,
epistemological undecidedness does not refer to a specific application of a de-
feasible rule, rather it corresponds to stating that a proposition is unknowable
independently of the way a definite truth value for it is derived. Continuing Pol-
lock’s example, having a picture showing that the object is red under normal
light would not be undercut, since a different rule of inference would be applied.
On the other hand, if it is known that the colour is unknowable since it ran-
domly changes continuously, then every argument saying that the object is red
(including the one based on the picture) is attacked.
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While the above considerations may suggest to model unknowability as a sort
of universal undercut, i.e. attacking all relevant rules, it has to be noted that
also defeasible premises of an argument can be affected by unknowability.
3 Unknowability in an ASPIC-like formalism
According to the considerations in the previous section, in order to capture
unknowability one may exploit the general model of structured argumentation
ASPIC+, which abstracts from the specific language used to construct argu-
ments and generalizes classical negation between formulas to a generic, possibly
asymmetric, relation of contrariness .̄ In this model, arguments are built from
a knowledge base, which includes a set of language elements partitioned into
axioms and ordinary premises, by applying two kinds of rules, i.e. strict and de-
feasible rules (depicted as single arrows → and double arrows ⇒, respectively).
Arguments can be represented as trees with roots corresponding to their con-
clusions and leaves to premises. The model is able to capture different kinds of
conflict, including undercutting, and to deal with a preference order between
arguments: we refer the reader to [7] for further details.
In order to capture unknowability, we can require that for each language
symbol a there are also two other symbols, i.e. ¬a and ⊗a, where ⊗a means
that a is unknowable. Then a strict or defeasible rule has a set of premises each
of them of the kind p, ¬p or ⊗p, where p ranges over the considered language,
and similarly for its consequent. As a consequence, chaining rules of inference
yields arguments that may have conclusions of the kind ⊗c (besides c and ¬c),
i.e. they can support unknowability.
The adoption of a third truth value makes it necessary to handle the relevant
contradictions between the language elements. One option would be to include
in the set of rules for any language element a the strict rules ⊗a → ¬a and
⊗a → ¬(¬a), i.e. if a proposition is unknowable then it cannot be true and it
cannot be false. However, since ¬a and ¬(¬a) are in contradiction, this would
mean that any argument for unknowability would give rise to a contradiction.
Another option is to exploit the generic relation of contrariness provided
in ASPIC+, by establishing that for any language element a the relations a =
{¬a,⊗a}, ¬a = {a,⊗a} and ⊗a = {a,¬a} hold, i.e. that a, ¬a and ⊗a are mu-
tually contradictory. However, a technical difficulty in ASPIC+prevents a direct
application of the formalism with a contrariness relation like this. More specif-
ically, in order to satisfy a set of rationality postulates, a closure requirement
on strict rules is required such that whenever there is a strict rule p → c then
−c ` −p, where −a denotes a language element a′ such that a′ ∈ a and a ∈ a′,
and ` denotes derivation under strict rules only. In our context, this entails that
whenever there is a strict rule p→ c then ¬c strictly entails ¬p and ⊗p, leading
to a contradiction.
Another way to model unknowability is to exploit modal operators, i.e. ex-
pressing the fact that p is known as K(p), the fact that ¬p is known as K(¬p) and
the fact that p is unknown as ¬K(p)∧¬K(¬p) (i.e. it is not known that p is true
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and it is not known that ¬p is true). It is worth noticing that this would not avoid
the need for a non binary relation of contrariness, e.g. K(p) = {K(¬p),¬K(p)}.
As a consequence, the technical difficulty mentioned above should still be dealt
with.
A solution to this problem can be obtained by closing the relation of con-
trariness under strict rules: a technical treatment of the resulting formalism is
however outside the scope of the present paper, and the reader is referred to [1]
for a preliminary proposal.
4 Application example
In order to illustrate the approach, let us consider a simple football example
where a set of defeasible rules model the relationship between players quality and
the plausibility of winning football matches. In particular, a simple modelling
may include a defeasible rule GPi ⇒ STi, i.e. if a team Ti has good players
(GPi) then normally it is strong (STi), a defeasible rule BPi ⇒ WTi, i.e.
if a team Ti has bad players (BPi) then normally it is weak (WTi), a rule
STi,WTj ⇒ TiWINS prescribing that if a team Ti is strong and another
team Tj is weak then Ti tends to win the match against Tj (TiWINS), and
another defeasible rule ⊗STi,WTj ⇒ ⊗TiWINS stating that the result of a
match between a team with unknown strength and a weak team is unknowable.
Now, assume there is a match between two teams T1 and T2 that are known
to have good and bad players, respectively. We can then build the arguments
α1 : GP1, α2 : α1 ⇒ ST1, β1 : BP2, β2 : β1 ⇒ WT2, γ1 : α2, β2 ⇒ T1WINS.
Since there are no attacks between arguments, all of them are justified and we
may conclude that T1 should win the match.
Assume now that T1 suffers some injuries (INJ1), and there is a defeasi-
ble rule stating that in this case the strength of a strong team becomes un-
knowable: GPi, INJi ⇒ ⊗(STi). Then we can construct the following argu-
ments in addition to the above ones: α3 : INJ1, α4 : α1, α3 ⇒ ⊗(ST1),
γ2 : α4, β2 ⇒ ⊗T1WINS. According to the relation of contrariness, α2 and
α4 have contradictory conclusions and the same holds for γ1 and γ2. If we adopt
a specificity criterion to compare arguments, α4 attacks α2 since it is based on
a greater set of premises, thus it also attacks γ1. As a consequence, γ2 emerges
as justified as well as its conclusion that the result of the match is unknowable.
5 Conclusions
In this position paper we have discussed the importance of dealing with unknowa-
bility in formal argumentation. Several research steps may then be performed.
First, a complete formal treatment based on ASPIC+has to be carried out.
This may also require to distinguish between the concept of “unknowability to a
single agent” vs “general unknowability”, which may affect the relation of attack
between arguments.
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A further development may account for different attitudes concerning un-
knowable facts, i.e. one may accept or refuse an argument based on them ac-
cording to pragmatic considerations on values, risks, and so on. In line with this,
it might be interesting to generalize the approach to continuous truth-values, i.e.
fuzzy propositions.
From a more conceptual point of view, similar issues concerning unknowa-
bility have been investigated in formal epistemology and epistemic logics, while
recent work discusses some connections between abstract argumentation and
epistemic logics [6, 10]. The relationships between these works and our proposal
will be a topic for further investigation, as well as the relation with formalisms to
deal with uncertainty. Finally, the distinction between different kinds of undecid-
edness discussed in Section 2 may be handled by explicitly identifying different
abstraction levels, thus raising interesting relationships with the work on meta-
argumentation [8, 3].
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